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Abstract
This paper investigates the causes underlying the poor school performance of children
in rural Bangladesh, while focusing on the eﬀect of work on school progress. To this end, a
dynamic switching model is presented for the sequence of school and work outcomes up to the
end of secondary school, where the switching in each school level considered is determined
by the endogenous work sequence up to that level. This approach allow us to characterize
the full sequence of school and work choices of children, and to evaluate the dynamic eﬀects
of work on schooling. We ￿nd that work has a negative and sizable eﬀect on school progress
for the entire population, as well as for all the subpopulations considered, including the
diﬀerent groups of working children. We are also able to identify at each school level the
observable and unobservable characteristics of working children relative to those of non-
working children. This characterization and the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects of work
have important policy implications.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although labor force participation rates for school-age children (i.e. aged 5-14) have been
declining over time, recent International Labor Organization estimates (1996) show that
child labor continues to be a very pervasive phenomenon, particularly in the developing
world, where it is generally accompanied by low levels of educational achievement.
Bangladesh is a typical example of this pattern, particularly in rural areas. Recent
estimates (Filmer, 1999) indicate that among children aged 15-19, 27.5 percent have never
attended school. Among those who attended school, 36 percent started school later than 6
years of age (the oﬃcial school entry age), 69.2 percent had reached secondary school, and
less than 20 percent had completed secondary school. Furthermore, estimates based on the
Child Labor Survey 1995-96 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1996) indicate that 19 percent
of children aged 5-14 are in the labor force, and child labor constitutes about 12 percent of
the total labor force of Bangladesh.
The literature on child labor and schooling in developing countries has been rapidly
expanding in recent years.2 Most studies either look at child labor and schooling separately
or focus on one or the other, particularly schooling. Most of the studies looking at child
schooling focus on static measures (e.g. school enrolment in a particular year) with only
a few papers looking at the dynamics of schooling (Lillard and Willis, 1994; Sawada and
Lokshin, 2001). To our knowledge, all of the studies looking at child labor focus on static
measures, such as work participation or hours of work in a particular year, or, at most,
2 See Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), and Basu (1999) for surveys of the literature.
2monthly variations within a year in these measures.
A number of studies, however, have analyzed the decisions regarding school and work
simultaneously. Most of these studies look at the determinants of child labor and schooling,
and then make statements about the degree of substitution between child work and schooling
based on the correlation between observables and/or unobservables in the work and school
equations.3 Some studies have also examined the impact of work on schooling indirectly by
considering the response of work and schooling to exogenous changes in the price of schooling
caused by school incentive programs.4
Finally, a few papers have provided direct estimates of the eﬀe c to fw o r ko ne d u c a t i o n
￿inputs￿ such as school attendance and hours of study (Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos,
1999), years of schooling and grade progression (Psacharopoulos, 1997), and education ￿out-
puts￿ such as cognitive achievement (Heady, 2000). However, in most cases the possible
self-selection into work is not accounted for, thereby clouding the interpretation of such
estimates as structural eﬀects. Furthermore, the studies that account for the endogeneity
of work do so within a restrictive framework that allows them to recover a single average
estimate of the eﬀect of work.5 From a policy perspective, the important question is not so
much to ￿nd out what the average eﬀect of work is but to identify the children who are most
aﬀected by it in terms of school progress, so that informed policies can be developed.
3 See, for example, Canagarajh and Coulumbe (1997), Grootaert (1998), Skou￿as (1994), Duraysamy
(2000), and Ridao-Cano (2001).
4 Examples are the Food-for-Education scheme in rural Bangladesh (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000) and
Progresa in rural Mexico (Schultz, 2001).
5 This is also true for the growing number of studies examining the eﬀect of working while in high school
on a variety of school outcomes in the U.S. See, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Dagenais et
al. (2001).
3This paper investigates the causes underlying the poor school performance of children
in rural Bangladesh, while focusing on the eﬀect of work on school progress. To this end, a
dynamic switching model is presented for the sequence of school and work outcomes up to
the end of secondary school, where the switching in each school level is determined by the
endogenous work sequence up to that level. This approach allow us to characterize the full
sequence of school and work choices of children, and to evaluate the dynamic eﬀects of work
on schooling.
We extend the existing literature in a number of ways. First, to our knowledge this is
the ￿rst paper in the context of developing countries to analyze the joint dynamics of school
and work. Second, the dynamic structure of our model allows us to extend some of the static
concepts from the program evaluation literature to a dynamic context.
The model provides a good description of the dynamics of school and work for the
children in the sample. The model is able to capture two types of interrelated selection
processes, namely selection into work and selection into school level. The main result of
this paper is that work has a negative and sizable eﬀect on school progress for the entire
population, as well as for all the subpopulations considered, including the diﬀerent groups
of working children. Furthermore, the eﬀect of work becomes more negative the earlier in
life an individual is exposed to work. We are also able identify at each school level the
observable and unobservable characteristics of working children relative to those of non-
working children. This characterization and the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects of work
have important policy implications.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this
study. Section 3 presents the dynamic model of school and work. Section 4 develops the
framework for evaluating the dynamic eﬀects of work on school progress. Section 5 presents
the general results of the model, analyzes the dynamic eﬀects of work and discusses the
eﬀects of a variety policies. Section 6 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
2D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
The data for the analysis come from the 1996 Matlab Health and Socio-Economic Survey
(MHSS). The survey covers 141 villages of Matlab, a region of rural Bangladesh where
there is an ongoing prospective Demographic Surveillance System. The MHSS collected
extensive current and retrospective information on multiple domains from approximately
38,000 individuals in a sample of over 7000 households, and conducted a detailed community
survey. A distinctive feature of the MHSS is its multistage sampling procedure which takes
into account the social structure in rural Bangladesh.6
The present analysis focuses on the school and work experiences, up to the end of sec-
ondary school, of individuals who were aged 15-25 at the time of the survey. This sample
contains both young adults living with their parents as well as young adults living on their
own, thus avoiding the typical sample selection bias arising from just considering those in
the former group.
6 As a result, weights are needed in the analysis of these data to correct for the non-random sample
distribution. For details on sample design, see Rahman et al. (1999), which can be found, along with other
documentation and the data, at http://ftp.rand.org/software_and_data/FLS/mhss/.
5The reason for setting the lower age limit at 15 is twofold. First, by using the sample of
young adults (15 years of age or older), the information on the individuals is as reported by
the same individuals and not their parents. Second, starting primary school at the oﬃcial
age, all the individuals in the sample except those aged 15 would have had the chance to
complete secondary school. The reason for setting the upper age limit at 25 is threefold.
First, the older the individual the more likely he or she is to make recollection errors. Second,
the parental and origin household information becomes more limited as we consider older
individuals, since they are more likely to live apart from their parents, and in this case
parental information is reported by the individual and not his or her parents. Finally, we
want to relate as much as possible our results to the current status quo of education in
Bangladesh, so as to make the proposed policies more relevant and signi￿cant. Using these
age cutoﬀs, and after dropping a few observations with missing values in the key variables,
the sample used for the empirical analysis contains 2489 individuals, 113/684 of which were
still in primary/secondary school at the time of the survey.
The MHSS contains detailed information on education histories including the school
entry age, school exit age, grades attended and completed, grade repetition. This paper
looks at the school and work outcomes in three ￿school￿ levels: school entry, primary school
and secondary school. The school outcome in the entry level looks at whether school entry
occurred at each age, starting from age 5 (the ￿rst reported entry age) up to age 14, beyond
which the child is no longer of primary-school age and thus he or she is assumed to be no
6longer at risk of entering school.7 The school outcome in the primary level looks at whether
a child reached secondary school in each possible time interval, starting from 5 years, which
is the minimum number of years required to reach secondary from school entry. For those
individuals still attending primary school, the school outcome looks at each of the years in
which the child could have not reached secondary school, being this observation censored
after the last year in which the child could have not reached secondary school. The school
outcome in the secondary school level is constructed the same way, but for secondary school
completion.
A few points are worth noting. First, the information on the timing of the school events
in the primary and secondary school levels is based on the number of repetitions in each
level. Second, the maximum time to reach and complete secondary school in the sample is
10 years. Third, the school outcome in the primary/secondary school level for individuals
who dropped out of school before reaching/completing secondary school is zero for all years
considered.
Fourth, the consideration of the timing of schooling events allows us to make use of the
information on censored observations that otherwise could not be used. This is particularly
important when we estimate the eﬀect of work on schooling, as part of the reason why some
children are still in school may lie in the lack of adequate school progress, which may in turn
be aﬀected by their work status. If this is the case, then the estimated eﬀects of work on the
probability of reaching/completing secondary school may be biased downward to the extent
7 We do not observe any children entering school after age 14.
7that a signi￿cant proportion of these children will never reach/complete secondary school.
Fifth, for the school outcome in the primary school level we choose to focus on whether
the child who entered primary school reached secondary school, instead of whether he or
she completed primary school, because the transition from the last grade in primary to the
￿rst grade in secondary is the single most important turning point in the Bangladeshi school
system, particularly for girls.
It is widely recognized that not all work is necessarily detrimental for child schooling,
although the question of how detrimental is an empirical one. The key is to identify the
kind of work that can potentially interfere with a child￿s schooling. The MHSS contains
retrospective information on the age at which each individual started performing productive
work, which we use to construct the work status variable in the entry level (i.e. work before
school entry age). In particular, an individual is considered to be in the working state at a
particular age at which school entry is considered if he or she was working at the prior age.8
The MHSS also contains retrospective information on whether an young adult performed
productive work while he or she was attending each school level (i.e. primary, secondary,
higher secondary, and higher education), which we use to de￿ne the work status variable in
the primary and secondary school levels.
All these pieces of information are reported by the young adult, thus minimizing the
typical under-reporting when it is the mother or the father who provides this information.
Individuals who consistently performed some kind of productive work before school entry or
8 Since the school year starts in January, if the individual started working at the same age he or she
entered school, he or she is considered not to have worked before school entry.
8while in primary or secondary school are those most likely to report work according to the
above de￿nitions, which are exactly the individuals that we are interested in. However, the
de￿nition of work as productive work ignores household chores such as caring for younger
siblings which, as Levison et al. (2001) point out, is likely to underestimate the amount
of work carried out by girls, and thus the role of work as a potential impediment for their
schooling. In our sample, all the children who start working in a given level continue working
in subsequent levels provided they reach those levels. Finally, it is worth noting that the
nature and motivation for work in each level is likely to be diﬀerent. For example, while the
child may have little to say in the decision to work before or during primary school, he or
she is likely to have a greater role in the decision to work during secondary school.
We choose to focus on the sequence school and work outcomes up to the end of secondary
school for two main reasons. First, we are mainly interested in the school and work experi-
ences of children. To this extent, a child starting school at the oﬃcial age of 6 would, in the
absence of school delay, complete secondary school by age 15, which de￿nes the beginning
of adulthood in Bangladesh. Second, we are mainly interested in the eﬀect of work on the
acquisition of basic skills needed in the labor market and in life, skills that are provided by
basic education which is, in turn, delivered by primary and secondary education.9
Table 1 shows the numbers and proportions of children by work sequence in each level,
where the work sequence in a given level is de￿ned by the work status in that level and the
work status in previous levels. The ￿rst two columns show these ￿gures for the row data,
9 In addition, the number of individuals in the sample pursuing higher education levels is very small.
9while the ￿gures in the last two columns are adjusted for censoring. As regards censoring,
it is assumed that if the individual is attending the last grade of the school level considered
and reports no work, then he or she is no longer at risk of working during that level, while
he or she is considered to be at risk if attending some other grade in that level.
The ￿gures in Table 1 show that the proportion of working children is high and increasing
by school level. This is not surprising since, other things being equal, older children are
not only more able to do work but they are also expected to contribute more to household
income. Very few of those who worked in the entry level entered school. The high proportion
of working children in the primary school level may be partly explained by the short duration
of the school day during primary school, which allows children to combine school and work,
particularly farm work. However, working children may ￿nd themselves less able to learn
as a result of exhaustion or insuﬃcient time to complete homework, which increases their
chances of failing and repeating a grade or dropping out of school altogether. Furthermore,
this ability to combine school and work diminishes as the child moves to higher grades, where
the required schooling time is greater.10
Table 2 reports the transition rates associated to the school outcome in each level by
work sequence. Individuals still attending a school level only contribute to the estimation
sample for that level if they could not have experienced the schooling event in 5 years, and
do so in the work sequence reported at the time of the survey. As expected, the greater the
diﬀerence in work intensity between two work sequences the greater the diﬀerence in the
10 This is particularly so in moving from primary school to secondary school where not only does the
required schooling time increase, but also the chances of having a secondary school nearby are lower.
10probability of experiencing the school event between them.
2.1 Model Covariates
For the model to be presented in the next section, we choose a parsimonious speci￿cation
for the observables determining the work and school outcome processes. These observable
characteristics include a set of child, parental and community characteristics that are, to a
large extent, relevant to the period when the child was in each school level.
Child characteristics that are common to the three levels include sex and age at the time
of the survey.11 We also include endogenous predetermined variables in the primary and
secondary school levels: school entry age in both levels, and number of grade repetitions
in the secondary school level. In addition, the primary and secondary school levels include
policy variables. In the primary school level we include an indicator for whether the child
was in primary school in or after 1992, the year in which compulsory primary education was
introduced,12 and a gender-speci￿c indicator for whether the child was in primary school
when free tuition for girls in secondary school grades 6-8 was implemented (i.e. 1990).13 In
the secondary school level we include an indicator for whether the child was in grades 6-8
when free tuition for girls in secondary school grades 6-8 was in place.
Parental characteristics include years of schooling of the mother and the father of the
11 The age at the time of the survey captures the overall time trend in the work and school outcomes.
12 More generally, 1992 marked an important turning point in education policy. The policies changes
aﬀected diﬀerent dimensions of the shadow price of schooling, including preferences for school and work, as
well as direct and indirect costs of schooling.
13 The idea is that the expectation of lower direct cost in secondary school increases the incentive to make
the transition to secondary school. This policy change may have also aﬀected the primary school outcome
of boys, as the cost of educating girls relative to boys decreases, and household resources are released.
11child. Household level variables have several dimensions. Household demographics are sum-
marized by the number of younger siblings and the number of older siblings when the child
was 6 years of age, for the entry level, and at the time the child started primary and sec-
ondary school, for the primary and secondary levels, respectively. Household productive
assets are summarized by whether the household has farm land, and non-farm business as-
sets. For children living with their parents this information refers to the time of survey,
and for children living separately this information refers to either the time of the survey if
parents are alive or the time of death if parents are dead. While the amount of land owned
or the value of non-farm business assets are likely to change over time, it is less likely that
whether the household owns some of these assets changes over time. In any case, if the
cross-sectional pattern in these variables does signi￿cantly change over time, we should not
expect any relationship between these variables and the work and school outcomes.
Household wealth is summarized by the current value of non-productive assets, such as
homestead land, precious metals and savings. In this case, looking at whether the household
owns any asset, or a particular asset such homestead land, is not applicable as all households
o w ns o m ek i n do fa s s e ta n dm o s to w nh o m e s t e a dl a n d . T h e￿nal quali￿cation made for
household productive assets applies here as well. This asset information is not available for
those children who are living away from their parents, so a dummy is included to control for
those.
In order to supplement the household wealth information (particularly for those children
for whom it is not available), an indicator for whether the household has a modern latrine
12(i.e. septic or slab latrine) is also used. This variable also proxies for the health environment
that the child was exposed to during school. This information refers to the time of the survey
for children living with their parents and to the time right before leaving the parental home
for children living on their own.14
Finally, a variety of village level variables are included, such as the presence of a tubewell
for drinking water, presence of a modern health facility, village economy diversi￿cation (i.e.
presence in the village of any mill, factory or workshop), distance to the capital of Matlab,
and the presence of primary and secondary schools. Village level variables refer to the period
when the child was 6 years of age (for the entry level), and the period prior to completion
of or drop out from primary and secondary school (for the primary and secondary levels,
respectively).15 The indicators for the presence of a primary and secondary school in the
village are included in the entry and primary levels, but only the latter is included in the
secondary level.
The work equations include, in addition, an indicator of whether the household cultivated
land (own land, rented or sharecropped) around the time the child was 6 years of age (for
the entry level), and around the time the child was in primary and secondary school (for the
primary and secondary levels, respectively). This variable is constructed on the basis of the
current cultivation status of the household, and the retrospective information on parental
occupation.16 Table 3 reports means and standard deviations of the above variables by
14 This information is available from the migration history of each individual in the sample.
15 The village where the child resided during each level is obtained from the migration history of each
child.
16 This variable proved to have a signi￿cant eﬀect on work but not on school progress conditional on work
13school level and work sequence.
3 A Dynamic Model of School and Work
The empirical framework is based on a traditional schooling-transition model (Mare 1980)
augmented to take into account the decision to work at each period.17 We focus on the
most important school transitions in the education system of Bangladesh: school entry,
transition from primary to secondary school and completion of secondary school. At each
period the household decides on the schooling and work status of the child conditional on
current and past information.18 Since the information set at each period includes the work
history of the child up to that period, the potential school outcomes at each period are not
only de￿ned by the working state in that period but also by the working states in previous
periods. Furthermore, the model speci￿cation allows for the existence of observable and
unobservable, to the econometrician, individual speci￿c heterogeneity.
Heckman and Cameron (1998) have shown that the schooling-transition model can be
rationalized based on an economic model of choice. Their main criticism of the model is that
it requires myopic behavior on the part of the individuals. As they indicate, the assumption
of myopic decision making implies that: ￿individuals ignore the potential value of future
status. As it is shown in the next section, this variable is not required for indenti￿cation. However, we gain
in identi￿cation power to the extent that it is a valid exclusionary restriction.
17 As mentioned in section 2, a period in the entry level is measured in years of age, starting at age 5 and
ending at age 14. In the primary and secondary levels, a period is measured in years to reach secondary
school and years to complete secondary school, respectively, starting from 5 years.
18 A household is viewed as a setting in which individuals with diﬀerent preferences and bargaining power
interact.
14shocks and act as though today￿s shock determines the value of all future shocks.￿ We agree
that this is an important criticism but consider that it is an acceptable restriction given the
limitations of the data.
Based on the schooling-transition model, we develop a dynamic switching model for the
sequence of school and work outcomes described in section 3, where the switching in each
school level is determined by the endogenous work sequence up to that level. In particular,
the working state in the entry level is de￿ned by the age prior to the age at which school
entry is considered, and de￿ned by level in the primary and secondary levels.19
Let t represent the period in which the school event in level k = {e,p,s} is considered,
where e represents school entry, p represents primary school, and s represents secondary
school. Also, let the working status in each (t,k) be represented by Wtk ∈ {0,1} and denote
the work sequence up to k (inclusive) by Hk. A sn o t e di ns e c t i o n2 ,i no u rs a m p l eo n c ea
child starts working he or she works thereafter. Hence the set of possible work sequences is
He ∈ {0,1}; Hp ∈ {(0,0),(0,1),(1,1)}
Hs ∈ {(0,0,0),(0,0,1),(0,1,1),(1,1,1)}
For each child i who has reached level k but has not experienced the school event by
period t, we consider the set of potential school outcomes associated with each work sequence:
19 However, to keep notation consistent throughout the model, we index work outcomes by the period in
which the school outcome in a given level is considered.
15Stk (Hk) ∈ {0,1}. Thus the potential school outcomes at (t,k) are not only dependent on
the working state at (t,k) but also on the work history prior to k.W ea s s u m et h a tWtk and
Stk (Hk) are generated by the following latent index structure
Wtki = 1[W
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tki (Hki) are the net utilities associated with Wtki and Stki (Hki), respec-
tively;20 Zki/Xki represents the vector of observed (by the econometrician) characteristics




i represents the unobserved (by the econometri-
cian), individual-speci￿c, propensity for work/schooling that is constant over time and com-
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20 Since in our sample once a child starts working he or she works thereafter, the work outcome at (t,k)
is deterministic (i.e. it is 1 with probability 1) for those who worked prior to (t,k).
16where λw (•) and λs (•) are the baseline hazard functions for the work and school equa-
tions, respectively.21 We assume (i)( εw
tki,εs
tki (Hk)) are mutually independent and identically
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kx (Hk)Xki) assume either arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small values or both; (v) Fθ (￿) is
a discrete distribution with a ￿nite and known number of mass points {θm}M
m=1, πm ≥ 0 is






m=1 πm =1(Heckman and
Singer, 1984); and (vi)( Xki,Z ki) vary across levels, and Xki varies across work sequences
within each level. Under these conditions identi￿cation of the model is a result of Theorem
4 and Theorem 5 in Heckman and Cameron (1998).22
While the original distribution of θ is reasonably ￿exible, because no functional form
21 λw (•) only applies to the work equation in the entry level.
22 Although condition (v) is not an assumption required for identi￿cation, it is satis￿ed by our data and
in practice should aid with the identi￿cation of the model.
17assumptions are made about Fθ (￿), it still assumes that the initial distribution of θ
s in the
working and non-working states is the same. Thus, we also estimate the model under an





1) and assume that θ is distributed a la Heckman-
Singer. In this case, identi￿cation requires that βeθ =( 1 ,1,1). Finally, we also estimate the
m o d e lf o rt h ec a s eo f(θ
w,θ
s) ∼ N (0,[1,1,ρ]).
As a result of the factor structure of the model, dependence between work/school out-
comes occurs through θ
w/θ
s, while dependence between school and work outcomes arises
from the correlation between θ
w and θ
s.23 In particular, the structure of the model allows
the school and work decisions in a given level to be correlated and subject to selectivity with
respect to school and work decisions in previous levels.
3.1 The Likelihood Function
A sample observation i consists of a set of work and school outcomes yi = {(Wtki,S tki):
t ∈ Tk,k ∈ {e,p,s}},a n das e to fi n s t r u m e n t sxi = {(Xki,Z ki):k ∈ {e,p,s}},w h e r eTk
represents the set of possible periods in k,w i t hTe = {5,...,14}, Tp = {5,...,10} and Ts =
{5,...,10}.24 In this framework, the contribution to the sample likelihood of observation i
23 Dependence also accurs through observable characteristics.
24 As noted in section 2, a child is assumed to be no longer at risk of entering school beyond 14 years
of age. The treatment of censoring of the work and school outcomes in the primary and secondary school
levels is outlined in section 3.
18conditional on θi, is













Finally, after integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity component, we obtain the fol-






When the Heckman-Singer approach is considered, the integration term is substituted by
a sum over the space of unobserved heterogeneity types. In this case, the probabilities
associated with the mass points and the mass points themselves are estimated along with
the other model parameters by maximum likelihood.
4 Dynamic Evaluation of the Eﬀect of Work on School
Progress
This section presents a dynamic extension of the static program evaluation framework based
on selection models.25 The crucial feature of this framework is the presence of heterogenous
25 See Heckman et al. (1999) for a review of the program evaluation literature.
19responses to treatment among observationally equivalent individuals upon which individuals
act. In this context, the treatment eﬀect is a random variable that cannot be summarized by
a single parameter. Thus a variety of treatment eﬀects can be de￿ned depending on the con-
ditioning sets and the summary statics desired. This framework allows us to identify which
groups are most aﬀected by treatment, and to assess the relative importance of observables
and unobservables in understanding the selection into treatment and outcome processes.
An important advantage of the dynamic model of school and work developed in section
4 is that it can be used to generate a rich set of dynamic mean treatment parameters from
a common set of structural parameters.
In the present context, we are ultimately interested in evaluating the eﬀect of work on
the probability that a child ever experiences the school event in each level. In particular, let
tk represent the maximum survival time in the sample for level k. Thus, for each possible
work sequence Hk in level k, the school outcome we are ultimately interested in is
Sk (Hk)=1
$














− Sk (Hk) denote the eﬀect on the school outcome in level
k of the work sequence H
+
k compared to a ￿lower￿ work sequence Hk for a given child, and
for any pair of work sequences belonging to the space of possible work sequences in level k.
This person-speci￿ce ﬀect is a counterfactual. For a given child, it answers the question of
what would be his or her school outcome if he or she had the work sequence H
+
k compared
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f o rag i v e np e r s o ns i n c ew e
never observe the same individual under both work sequences. Instead, we can work with
population means or distributions of these variables. In this paper, we focus on a variety
of dynamic mean treatment parameters that diﬀer in the conditioning set on which they
are de￿ned. In particular, we consider the dynamic versions of three familiar static mean
treatment parameters, namely the dynamic average treatment eﬀect (DATE), the dynamic
average treatment eﬀect on the treated (DTT) and the dynamic average treatment eﬀect on
the untreated (DTU).
Let us start by de￿ning the short-run eﬀects. The ￿rst one we consider is the dynamic
average treatment eﬀect on the school outcome in level k of the work sequence H
+
k compared
21to a ￿lower￿ work sequence Hk. This parameter is de￿ned as the average eﬀect of the work
sequence H
+
k over the work sequence Hk for a child randomly selected from the initial


















If we de￿ne (6) for the work status during level k only we obtain the static ATE of working
during level k. The dynamic average treatment eﬀect on the treated is de￿ned as (6) but
for a child randomly selected from the population of children who actually experienced the
work sequence H
+




















Note that (7) controls for selection into the work sequence H
+
k on the basis of both
observable and unobservable characteristics. Also, if we de￿ne (7) for the work status during
level k and for the working population in that level we obtain the static TT of working during
level k. Finally, if instead we condition (7) on Hk, or any other possible work sequence at k
diﬀerent from H
+
k , we obtain the dynamic average treatment eﬀect on the untreated (DTU).







alent individuals is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for (6) and (7) to be diﬀerent. In
particular, unless individuals act on this unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. select into a partic-
ular work sequence on the basis of unobservable gains/losses associated with that sequence
22compared to another), the two dynamic treatment parameters are identical.
We compute the above dynamic mean treatment eﬀects using simulation techniques.
I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eu s et h ee s t i m a t e dm o d e lt og e tas u ﬃciently large simulated sample.26
Then we use the model to simulate the sequence of school outcomes under alternative work
sequences. The outcomes under any given pair of work sequences are then compared either
for full sample (DATE) or subsamples of individuals. In each level, these subsamples can be
de￿ned by the groups of individuals for whom the unrestricted model predicts would select
into each possible work sequence in that level (DTT and DTU). Standard errors for the
dynamic mean treatment eﬀects are computed using the parametric bootstrap method.27
5M o d e l R e s u l t s
We estimate the dynamic switching model under the three alternative speci￿cations of θ
d e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n3 .F o rt h et w os p e c i ￿cations involving a non-parametric distribution of
θ,w e￿nd, after experimentation, that three types for each element of θ describes the data
quite well. The lack of suﬃcient variation in the data prevented us from estimating a separate
equation for Stp(1,1). Instead we constrain the diﬀerence between Stp (1,1) and Stp (0,1)
to a constant. Likewise, the only individual with work sequence (1,1,1) contributing to the
estimation sample in the secondary school level is aggregated with those with work sequence
26 For each individual in the sample we generate a θ type based on the estimated distribution Fθ (￿).
Likewise, we generate i.i.d. shocks to work, εw
tki, and schooling, εs
tki (Hki).
27 In particular, we ￿rst use the estimated asymptotic normal distribution of the vector of parameters to
generate vectors of parameter values. We then compute the dynamic treatment eﬀects under each of these
vectors and calculate their standard deviation.
23(0,1,1) in equation Sts(0,1,1).
To discriminate among competing models (including the one without unobserved het-
erogeneity), we use the likelihood ratio tests (LR) and the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC).28 Appendix D shows that the two models with a non-parametric speci￿cation of un-
observed heterogeneity compare favorably against the model with normal heterogeneity and
the model without unobserved heterogeneity. Between the two non-parametric speci￿cations,
the LR test tends to favor somewhat the more ￿exible three-factor model. However, using
BIC (which accounts for the diﬀerence in the number of parameters) the more parsimonious
two-factor model is preferred. In addition, in contrast with the two-factor model, all of the
probabilities associated with mass points are estimated very imprecisely in the three-factor
model. Thus, the two-factor model appears to be the speci￿cation that best describes the
dynamic sequence of work and school outcomes given the variation in observable character-
istics. For the remaining of the paper we focus the discussion on the results of the two-factor
model.29
Estimates of the parameters associated with the work and school outcome equations in
the three school levels are reported in Table 4.1 through Table 4.3. Table 4.1 also reports
the estimated correlation between θ
w and θ
s.
In addition to the tests in Appendix D, another way of evaluating the importance of con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity is to examine its impact on the estimated coeﬃcients.
28 T h ep - v a l u e so ft h eL Rt e s t sa r em e a n ta sh e u r i s t ic guides only, and cannot be interpreted using
the standard Chi-square tables as the models being compared are non-nested. BIC is, however, valid for
discriminating between non-nested models.
29 The results for the other models are available upon request from the authors.
24In particular, all the parameters associated with the unobserved heterogeneity components
are sizable and statistically signi￿cant, which indicates the importance of accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity when analyzing selection into work and selection into school level.
The presence of selection on unobservable characteristics in these data has a signi￿cant im-
pact on the parameters associated with exogenous covariates, which are generally larger in
magnitude and more statistically signi￿cant than in model without unobserved heterogeneity.
This gives and indication of the extent to which the parameters associated with exogenous
covariates in the model without unobserved heterogeneity are subject to dynamic selection
bias. Likewise, once we account for selection on unobservables the parameter estimates on
predetermined endogenous variables change signi￿cantly with respect to those in the model
without unobserved heterogeneity, which indicates evidence of endogeneity bias.
As regards the baseline hazards, the results show that both the probability of working
before school entry increases with age, while the probability entering school follows an in-
verted u-curve. In the primary and secondary levels, the probability of experiencing the
s c h o o le v e n td e c r e a s e sa st h ec h i l da c c u m u l a t e sm o r es c h o o ld e l a y .
In general, the observable characteristics that make an individual more likely to work also
make him or her less likely to experience the schooling event under any work sequence. This
oﬀers insight into the presence of selection into work on the basis of observable characteristics.
Likewise, the observable characteristics that make an individual more likely to experience
the school event in one level also make him or her more likely to succeed in subsequent levels.
This indicates evidence of school level selectivity on the basis of observable characteristics.
25Child characteristics
Delaying school entry increases the probability of working during primary school and,
specially, secondary school. Conditional on work sequence, however, school entry age only
has a signi￿cantly negative eﬀect on the probability of reaching secondary for those who did
not work during primary school. To the extent that work reduces the likelihood of experienc-
ing the school event, these results show that school entry age has an indirect negative eﬀect
on schooling. The eﬀect on work may indicate that older children are physically more able
to do productive work, and they are expected to contribute more to household income than
younger children. The eﬀect on schooling indicates that older children may have a hard time
￿tting in classrooms with younger classmates, and may have fewer chances of continuing in
school after failing a grade.
Grade repetition in primary school increases the probability of working during secondary
school. Conditional on work sequence, grade repetition reduces the probability of completing
secondary school, but only signi￿cantly so for those who started working during secondary
school. For those who were working before entering secondary school, grade repetition has
an indirect negative eﬀect on secondary school completion.
Girls are signi￿cantly less likely to work in all levels except in primary school. This gender
diﬀerence in work propensities is particularly marked in the secondary level. As noted in
section 2, our de￿nition of work refers to productive work only, and thus ignores household
chores, which are more likely to be performed by girls. Girls are signi￿cantly less likely to
experience the school event in all three levels but only under the non-working sequences.
26However, these are the sequences where girls are more likely to be. Hence the gender gap in
education persists as we move to higher school levels among non-working children but seems
to disappear after school entry among working children.
If the child was in primary school when the compulsory schooling law was in place, his or
her chances of working during primary school are signi￿cantly lower, while his or her chances
of reaching secondary school are greater, although only signi￿cantly so in the non-working
state. These eﬀects stand apart from the overall time trends in school and work, as captured
by the eﬀect of age at the time of the survey.
If the child was in primary school when free tuition for girls in secondary school was
introduced, his or her chances of working in primary school are unaﬀected. However, the
eﬀect of this policy on schooling is equally positive for both boys and girls in the working
state, but only signi￿cantly positive for girls in the non-working state. These results suggest
that the anticipation of this policy had a positive income eﬀect on the probability of reaching
secondary school for both boys and girls, and a substitution eﬀect in favor of girls among
non-working children. If the child was in secondary school grades 6-8 when the free tuition
policy was active, his or her chances of working are lower, specially for boys. This mainly
re￿ects an income eﬀect whereby the need for a child to contribute to household income is
reduced, and since boys are more likely to contribute to household income than girls the
eﬀect is far greater for them. The eﬀect of this policy on secondary school completion is
signi￿cantly positive for girls only among non-working children, and signi￿cantly positive for
both genders among those who started working in secondary school, specially for boys. In
27contrast with the eﬀect of this policy in primary school, here there seems to be a surprising
substitution eﬀect in favor of boys among children who start working in secondary school.
However, this result must be interpreted with caution as girls are much less likely to work
in secondary school.
Parental and household characteristics
With regard to parental education, only the education of the father signi￿cantly reduces
the probability of working in primary school. The education of either parent increases
the probability of entering school and reaching secondary school under all work sequences,
although the eﬀect of mother￿s education is larger in all cases. The positive eﬀect of mother￿s
education persists into secondary school in all work sequences, but that of the father only
has a signi￿cant eﬀect among non-working children, and even then the eﬀect is smaller than
that of mother￿s education. Parental education can potentially in￿uence the allocation of
children￿s time directly, mainly through income and preferences, and indirectly through its
eﬀect on the bargaining power of the mother relative to that of the father (Ridao-Cano,
2001). Even assuming equal income eﬀects, this diﬀerential eﬀect of education by gender of
the parent may suggest that women have a higher preference for child schooling than men.
Household wealth, as indicated by household assets or the ownership of a modern la-
trine, signi￿cantly reduces the probability of working in all but the primary level, while it
signi￿cantly increases the probability of experiencing the school event in each level under all
possible work sequences. These results indicate that, apart from its income eﬀect, household
wealth may play an important role as a cushion against economic shocks in the absence of
28well-developed capital markets.30
In all but the entry level, the ownership of at least one of two household productive
assets signi￿cantly increases the probability of work, particularly the ownership of a non-
farm business. Likewise, in all but the secondary school outcome for children who were
working before entering secondary school, the ownership of at least one of two household
productive assets signi￿cantly increases the probability of work.
Household productive assets have both a positive income eﬀect and a negative substitu-
tion eﬀect on a child￿s schooling. 31 The positive eﬀect of household productive assets on
child work indicates that the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect for this out-
come. However, conditional on working status all we have left is the income eﬀect, which
is signi￿cantly positive in all but one school outcome equation. Controlling for whether the
household owns farm land, the fact that the household cultivates land (whether own land
or rented/sharecropped) signi￿cantly increases the probability of work in all but the entry
level.
In theory, the age composition of siblings plays a mixed role in the allocation of children￿s
time. The presence of other siblings in the household increases competition for household
resources for education and otherwise. The pressure on household resources is particularly
intensi￿ed by the presence of younger siblings, since they are less likely to contribute to
household income, thus increasing the need for child work. The presence of older siblings
30 Jacobi and Skou￿as (1997) present evidence on how child time is used as an insurance mechanism
against economic shocks in the absence of well-functioning capital markets.
31 The presence of a productive household asset increases the shadow price of schooling by increasing the
value of the marginal product of children (see, for example, Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).
29makes the sharing of work responsibilities more likely, reduces the value of the marginal
product of the child, and potentially results in higher household income. The number of older
siblings has the expected negative eﬀect on work, but this eﬀect is only signi￿cant in the
secondary level, while the number of younger siblings increases the probability of work before
school entry but decreases the probability of work in secondary school. Conditional on work
sequence, the eﬀect of the number of older siblings on schooling is always positive whenever
signi￿cant, while the eﬀect of the number of younger siblings is signi￿cantly negative in the
secondary level among those who start working in that level, but signi￿cantly positive among
working children in the primary level.32
Village characteristics
The presence of a secondary school in the village has a signi￿cant eﬀect on work, but only
in the secondary level where the presence of a secondary school nearby seems to facilitate
the combination of school and work activities. School availability should in theory have a
signi￿cant eﬀect on schooling. The results show that this does generally seem to be case for
secondary schools but not for primary schools, which is not surprising given the fact that
most children in the sample lived in a village with a primary school by the time they were 6.
The presence of health-related infrastructure in the village has a signi￿cantly negative eﬀect
on work in the secondary level but signi￿cantly positive in the primary level. The bene￿ts
on schooling seem to be particularly strong in the entry and primary levels.
Child work is likely to be related with subsistence agriculture. In the absence of capital
32 This unexpected positive eﬀect may be explained by the combination of younger siblings not competing
for education resources and also contributing to household income.
30markets, reliance on agriculture makes children￿s time more likely to be used as an insurance
mechanism against shocks, which are common in the agriculture sector. A more diversi￿ed
village economy (as indicated by the presence of some form of industry) has no signi￿cant
eﬀect on work but it does generally have a consistently positive eﬀect on schooling throughout
the three levels. The capital of Matlab provides access to a big market, health facilities, credit
institutions, schools and employment opportunities. Villages further away from the capital
of Matlab have a higher incidence of child work in the primary level, and consistently lower
school transition and completion rates.
5.1 Simulated Eﬀects of Work on School Progress
Table 5 reports the simulated mean eﬀects of work by school outcome, pair of work sequences
and population. As work in the entry level may refer to any age prior to the school entry
age, we de￿ne the working state in the entry level as having a probability one of working at
each age.
The dynamic average treatment eﬀects (DATE) are found to be negative and sizable in
all levels and for all possible pairs of work sequences. The greater the diﬀerence in work
intensity between two work sequences the larger the diﬀerence in school outcomes. Thus, for
a random individual work reduces his or her probability of experiencing the school event at
each level, and the younger this individual is exposed to work the more negative the eﬀect
of work. For example, if a child starts working in primary school his or her probability
of reaching secondary school is reduced by 10.73 percent, while if he or she starts working
31before school entry this probability is reduced by 33.20 percent.
In all three school levels, the dynamic treatment eﬀect on the treated (DTT) is less
negative than the DATE for all pairs of work sequences involving work in the entry level,
except the one in which the sequence being compared is no work up to secondary school
(inclusive). More precisely, the diﬀerence in the entry and primary school outcomes between
a work sequence involving work before school entry and a less work-intensive sequence is
generally less negative for those who worked in the entry level than for the entire population,
particularly in the entry and primary school levels. The opposite is true for all pairs involving
work starting in primary school or work starting in secondary school. Furthermore, the eﬀect
of work on the school outcomes of each treated population becomes more negative the greater
the diﬀerence in work intensity between the work sequence of the treated population and
the comparison sequence.
In a dynamic context, however, it is probably more informative to compare, the treat-
ment eﬀect on the treated with the treatment eﬀects for those who select into other possible
work sequences in that level. To focus the discussion below, we choose to report the dy-
namic treatment eﬀect on the untreated (DTU) for the group of children who select into the
work sequence being compared. The diﬀerence in all three school outcomes between a more
work-intensive sequence and a less work-intensive sequence is always more negative for the
untreated population than for the treated population or the entire population, particularly
when the treated population started working before school entry. The eﬀect of work start-
ing in secondary school is, however, more negative for the treated population than for the
32untreated population.
What these comparisons indicate is that in most cases treated populations have a com-
bination of observable and unobservable characteristics that make them less likely to be
aﬀected by the work sequence they have selected in than untreated populations. This is
particularly so the more work-intensive the treatment sequence is. In particular, the eﬀect
of work appears to be smaller for working children than for non-working children and, within
working children, the longer a child has been exposed to work the smaller the impact of work.
The exception to this pattern involves children who started working in secondary school.
Comparing the simulated treatment eﬀects with the non-parametric mean diﬀerences of
Table 2, we observe that although the basic picture of more work leading to worse school
outcomes remains the same, there are systematic diﬀerences in the magnitudes. In particular,
the treatment eﬀects on the treated are signi￿cantly less negative than the corresponding
mean diﬀerences for the primary and, particularly, entry school outcomes. However, the three
pairs of sequences in the secondary level for which a comparison can be made, the reverse is
true.33 Thus controlling for selection appears to be very important in these data. The next
step in the analysis is then to examine the contribution of observables and unobservables to
this pattern.
33 Note that none of these pairs includes the sequence (1,1,1).
335.2 The Relation Between Selection and School Outcomes
A central question in this paper is to identify the observable and unobservable characteristics
of the diﬀerent groups of working children that make them more or less sensitive to the work
regime they have selected in than other groups of children. As it will noted in the concluding
section, this characterization has major implications for policies aimed at increasing school
progress through reductions in child work.
To this extent, this section examines the contribution of observables and unobservables
to the diﬀerences between DTT and DTU. For this task, we need to relate selection on






.I nd o i n gs o ,w en e e d
to distinguish between two types of interrelated selection processes: selection into work and
selection into school level. While selection into school level occurs until the last school level
an individual attends, selection into work (i.e. the decision of whether to work or not) only
occurs up to the level the individual starts working (inclusive) or up to the secondary level
for those who never work (inclusive). This is because the work decision is deterministic once
an individual starts working, and thus his or her work sequence in future levels is determined
by the work sequence up to the level he or she started working (inclusive).
Hence, for a given level, selection into work can help us understand the diﬀerence between
DTT and DTU for work sequences that only diﬀer in the work status in that level. For
example, we use the selection into work argument when comparing the eﬀect of (0,1) versus
(0,0) for those select into (0,1) and those who select into (0,0). However, when comparing
the treatment eﬀects in the secondary level for children in sequence (0,1,1) with those in
34sequences (0,0,1) and (0,0,0) we must invoke both the selection into work eﬀect in the
primary level and the selection into secondary school eﬀect.
Let us start with a general description of the selection into school level process. Table
6 shows the distribution of θ
s b yl e v e la n dw o r ks e q u e n c e .F o ra l lg r o u p s ,t h ed i s t r i b u t i o n
of θ
s shifts to the right across school levels as low θ
s individuals are screened out. Overall,
the extent of cream-screening is larger among working children than among non-working
children. This is because, relative to non-working children, working children are faced with
lower values of β
s
xX, so they tend to continue schooling only if they also have a high θ
s.
By comparing the average values of β
s
xX across levels for each work sequence, we observe
that, ￿rst, there is a very signi￿cant selection on observables in the transition to primary
school among those who worked in the entry level and, second, there is also a signi￿cant
selection on unobservables in the transition to secondary school among children who attended
primary school. Not surprisingly, this selection is more accentuated among non-working
children in primary school who, relative to working children, need a higher value of β
sX to
compensate for their lower θ
s.
Let us now consider selection into work. To analyze selection into work on the basis
of unobservables, and thus relate Uw to the counterfactual ∆,T a b l e7r e p o r t s ,f o re a c h








s + εs. To examine selection into work on the basis of observables, and thus relate
β
w
z Z to ∆, Table 7 also reports, for each level, the correlations between β
w




In the entry level, the higher the unobserved propensity to work the lower the unobserved
propensity to enter school in either state, but particularly so in the non-working state. Thus,
in terms of unobservables, working children would bene￿t less from not working. However,
in terms of observables a higher propensity to work is associated with lower probability
of school entry in either state, but particularly in the working state. Thus, in terms of
observables, working children would bene￿t more from not working. Altogether, it appears
that selection on unobservables is stronger than selection on observables in explaining why
the eﬀect of work in the entry level is less negative for those who work than for those who
do not. In particular, children who work in the entry level are those who would bene￿tt h e
least from not working. Furthermore, in terms of our typology, they are more likely to be of
type ∆e =0( Se (1) = 0,S e(0) = 0).
Let us now consider selection into work in the primary level among those who did not
work before school entry. In terms of unobservables, the higher the propensity to work
the higher the propensity to reach secondary school in either state, but particularly in the
working state. In terms of observables a higher propensity to work is associated with a lower
probability of school entry in either state, but particularly so in the non-working state. Hence
selection on observables and unobservables reinforce each other in explaining why those who
start working in primary school are less aﬀected by work than non-working children. Thus,
as for those who work in the entry level, children who start working in primary school
would bene￿t less from not working than non-working children, but for opposite reasons. In
36particular, these working children are more likely to be of type (Sp (0,1) = 1,S p (0,0) = 1)
than those who do not work in primary school.
Despite the signi￿cant selection of those in the sequence (1,1) out of the initial population
in (1),t h e yc o n t i n u et oh a v el o w e rv a l u e so fβ
s
xX and θ
s relative to the children in other
primary work sequences. This explains the smaller eﬀect of sequence (1,1) versus sequences
(0,1) and (0,0) for the treated than for the untreated populations. Thus, those in (1,1) are
less likely to bene￿t from not working before school entry than those in (0,1) and (0,0) in
terms of reaching secondary school. This is because, relative to other children in primary
school, they have characteristics that make them less likely to reach secondary school under
any regime.
Let us now consider selection into work in the secondary level among those who did not
work in primary school. In terms of unobservables, a high propensity to work is associated
with an equally high propensity to reach secondary school in either state. This indicates
that children who start working in secondary school have unobservable characteristics that
make them more likely to complete secondary school than those who do not work in either
state. However, these characteristics make them equally likely to perform well in both
states. Hence, in terms of unobservables working children are equally likely to bene￿tf r o m
not working than non-working children. However, in terms of observables, working children
have observable characteristics that make them less likely to complete secondary school than
non-working children in either state, but particularly in the working state. This explains
why the eﬀect of starting to work in secondary school is actually less negative for those who
37do not work than for those who started working in secondary school. Thus, working children
are more likely to bene￿t from not working in secondary school than non-working children.
The diﬀerence in the eﬀe c t sf o rc h i l d r e ni ns e q u e n c e(1,1,1) relative to those in sequences
(0,1,1) and (0,0,1) can still be explained in terms of a lower θ
s. In the case of comparing
children in (1,1,1) with those in (0,0,1),al o w e rθ
s is also accompanied by lower values of
β
s
xX. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect with respect to the non-working group cannot be explained
in terms of θ
s since children in the sequence (1,1,1) do actually have a higher θ
s. However,
this eﬀect is more than oﬀset by their much lower values of β
s
xX . Again, children in (1,1,1)
are less aﬀected by work than children in the other sequences because, relative to them,
they have characteristics that make them less likely to complete secondary school under any
regime.
The eﬀect of the work sequence (0,1,1) versus the sequence (0,0,1) is not signi￿cantly
diﬀerent for the treated and untreated children, which indicates that the higher θ
s of the
treated gets oﬀset by their lower values of β
s
xX. Thus both groups of children are equally
likely to bene￿t from not working in primary school relative to working in secondary school
only in terms of completing secondary school. The eﬀect of (0,1,1) versus (0,0,0) is less
negative for the treated than for the untreated, which indicates that the lower values of β
s
xX
of the treated population more than oﬀsets their higher θ
s.T h u s ,b e c a u s eo ft h e i rr e l a t i v e
higher values of unobservable characteristics, children in (0,1,1) would bene￿tm o r et h a n
non-working children from not having to work at any level.
Summarizing, the extent of cream-screening across school transitions is larger for working
38children than for non-working children. Thus, working children that remain in school tend
to have a higher unobserved propensity for schooling than non-working children. This tends
to make the negative eﬀect of work smaller for those who start working in primary school
relative to non-working children in the primary level, and for all working children relative
to non-working children in the secondary level. However, working children are subject to
greater selection than non-working children because they face a worse environment in terms
of observable characteristics.
Hence, by simply looking at the unobservable characteristics of working children in a
particular school level, without actually understanding the nature of the selection process,
we would tend to underestimate the bene￿ts of policies to reduce child work, as we would
observe many working children are able to make it through school without such a policy.
However, if we were to expose working children to the same environment that non-working
children have, we would not observe the systematic diﬀerences in selection patterns outlined
above, and thus we would most likely observe similar negative eﬀects of work for both groups
of children.
These ￿ndings have important policy implications. First, any assessment of policies to re-
duce child work in primary school or secondary school must be based on a full understanding
of the nature of the selection process across school transitions. Second, the magnitude of the
eﬀects of work on school progress makes policies aimed at increasing school progress through
reductions in child work most relevant. Third, the eﬀectiveness of these policies would be
greatly increased if they were accompanied by eﬀorts to improve the adverse environment
39that working children face.
5.3 Policy Simulations
Motivated by the previous policy implications, in this section we simulate the dynamic
eﬀects of three policies. We ￿rst evaluate the eﬀect of the compulsory primary schooling
policy introduced in 1992. In particular, we compare the current environment with the
simulated outcomes in the absence of this policy. Second, we consider a policy that makes
school entry compulsory at age 6 and compare its eﬀects with the simulated outcomes in
the unrestricted model. Third, we consider a policy that makes access to secondary school
universal against the simulated outcomes in the unrestricted model for diﬀerent populations
of working children. The ￿rst two policies are aimed at increasing school progress indirectly
by reducing child work as well as directly. The third policy is aimed at increasing school
progress directly by improving the schooling environment.
As Table 8 shows, the compulsory primary schooling policy had a signi￿cant impact on
the probability of reaching secondary school, which is partly explained by its sizable eﬀect on
work during primary school. Making school entry compulsory at age 6 would signi￿cantly
decrease the probability of working in primary school and secondary school, although its
eﬀect on schooling would only be sizable in the primary school level. The availability of
secondary schools would have a bene￿cial eﬀect on schooling, particularly in the entry level.
In all three school levels, the bene￿ts of this policy would be mainly accrued by working
children, particularly those who started working younger, which highlights the importance
40of policies aimed at improving the adverse environment that working children face.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the causes underlying the poor school performance of children in
rural Bangladesh, while focusing on the eﬀect of work on school progress. To this end,
we specify an econometric model that is able to capture two types of interrelated selection
processes in the data, namely selection into work and selection into school level.
We ￿nd that work has a negative and sizable eﬀect on the school outcome in each level
for the entire population, as well as for all the subpopulations considered. Furthermore, the
eﬀect of work becomes more negative the earlier in life an individual is exposed to work.
We also ￿nd that in most cases work appears to have a smaller eﬀect for working children
than for non-working children and, among working children, the younger a child started
to work the smaller the impact of work. Thus, in terms of school progress, it appears
that working children would bene￿t less from not working than non working children. The
exception to this pattern involves children who started working in secondary school. In
analyzing the contribution of observables and unobservables to this result, we ￿nd that
working children in the primary and secondary school levels tend to have a higher unobserved
propensity for schooling than non-working children, but that is because they have been
subject to greater selection than non-working children which is, in turn, explained by the
relatively more adverse environment that working children face. In particular, in all cases
working children face a worse environment in terms of observable characteristics than non-
41working children, more so the younger the child started working. Hence, by simply looking
at the unobservable characteristics of working children in a particular school level, without
actually understanding the nature of the selection process, we would tend to underestimate
the bene￿ts of policies to reduce child work, as we would observe many working children are
able to make it through school without such a policy. However, if we were to expose working
children to the same environment that non-working children have, we would not observe the
systematic diﬀerences in selection patterns outlined above, and thus we would most likely
observe similar negative eﬀects of work for both groups of children.
These ￿ndings have important policy implications. First, any assessment of policies to re-
duce child work in primary school or secondary school must be based on a full understanding
of the nature of the selection process across school transitions. Second, the magnitude of the
eﬀects of work on school progress makes policies aimed at increasing school progress through
reductions in child work most relevant. Third, the eﬀectiveness of these policies would be
greatly increased if they were accompanied by eﬀorts to improve the adverse environment
that working children face.
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Table 1. Children by Work Sequence in Each Level 
 
  Unadjusted for censoring Adjusted for censoring 
 Count Percent Count Percent 
School entry   
1 = e H   329 13.22 329 13.22 
0 = e H   2160 86.78 2160 86.78 
Total 2489 100.00 2489 100.00 
Primary school   
) 1 , 1 ( = p H   24 1.23 24 1.24 
) 1 , 0 ( = p H   546 27.94 546 28.33 
) 0 , 0 ( = p H   1384 70.83 1357 70.42 
Total 1954 100.00 1927 100.00 
Secondary school   
) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H   5 0.39 5 0.48 
) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H   272 21.13 272 26.08 
) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   351 27.27 351 33.65 
) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   659 51.20 415 39.79 
Total 1287 100.00 1043 100.00 
Notes:  e H ,  p H , and  s H  represent the work sequence in the entry, primary and secondary school levels, 
respectively. The work sequence in each level includes the work status in that level as well as the work 
status in previous levels. For example,  ) 1 , 0 ( = p H  represents the work sequence in the primary school 
















Table 2. Estimated Transition Rates Associated to Each School Outcome by Work 
Sequence 
 
 Estimate Std.  Err. Comparison Difference  LR  test:  χ
2(1) 
School entry   
(1) 1 = e H   0.073 0.014 (1) Vs (2) -0.821  723.58 (0.000)
(2) 0 = e H   0.893 0.007  
Transition to secondary school   
(3)  ) 1 , 1 ( = p H   0.222 0.089 (3) Vs (4) -0.283  3.21 (0.073)
(4)  ) 1 , 0 ( = p H   0.505 0.022 (3) Vs (5) -0.513  14.86 (0.000)
(5)  ) 0 , 0 ( = p H   0.735 0.012 (4) Vs (5) -0.231  96.20 (0.000)
Secondary school completion   
(6) ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H   (6) Vs (7) -0.076  3.85 (0.050)
(7) ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   (6) Vs (8) -0.139  22.00 (0.000)
(8) ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   (7) Vs (8) -0.063  7.71 (0.005)
Notes: See notes to Table 1. There is only one case with  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H  contributing to the estimation sample (see text 
for details), which we aggregate with  ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H . LR test corresponds to the likelihood ratio test for equality of 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1. Dynamic Switching Model of School and Work: School Entry Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
te W  ) 0 ( te S  ) 1 ( te S  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value
Intercept -6.259 -4.606 -6.465 -13.466 -1.518  -0.062
Baseline hazard (1)  2.868 3.085 1.688 13.547 9.040  1.892
Baseline hazard (2)  3.314 3.610 2.883 23.174  
Baseline hazard (3)  3.878 4.318 3.613 27.967  
Baseline hazard (4)  6.975 8.216 3.595 25.613  
Baseline hazard (5)  5.368 6.137 4.011 27.003  
Baseline hazard (6)  7.588 8.876 3.048 14.854  
Baseline hazard (7)  7.053 8.145 2.859 12.310  
Baseline hazard (8)  1.053 2.470  
Girl -1.022 -5.046 -0.401 -5.187 1.017  0.489
Age 0.010 0.359 0.021 1.600 -1.486  -2.879
Mother￿s education  0.027 0.385 0.151 8.644 1.781  2.387
Father￿s education  0.038 1.032 0.086 7.848 1.082  2.105
Household assets missing  -2.207 -2.253 0.658 1.482 14.386  0.779
Log(household assets)  -0.244 -2.630 0.063 1.603 0.967  0.545
Modern latrine  -0.053 -0.198 0.599 7.441 7.984  2.392
Cultivating household  0.241 1.176  
Owns farm land  0.183 0.966 0.544 6.062 -2.458  -1.105
Owns non-farm business  0.015 0.089 0.120 1.665 5.595  2.621
Older siblings  -0.061 -1.279 -0.014 -0.758 1.031  2.331
Younger siblings  0.170 1.890 -0.010 -0.232 -0.409  -0.278
Village outside Matlab  0.211 0.566 0.466 2.617 -7.980  -1.089
Tubewell in village  -0.112 -0.532 0.141 1.593 -0.400  -0.186
Health facility in village  -0.628 -0.754 1.113 13.028 5.740  1.281
Industry in village  -0.133 -0.513 0.231 2.162 6.681  3.180
Primary school in village  -0.186 -1.026 0.121 1.368 -1.520  -0.722
Secondary school in village  -0.695 -1.026 0.701 7.395 7.732  1.466
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.007 -0.365 -0.044 -5.244 -0.349  -0.679
w θ   1.000  
s θ   9.602 3.432 1.000 
) , ( s w Corr θ θ   -0.315  
Log-L -8527.370   
Notes: The specification of the baseline hazard in each equation is given by the variation in the data. For 
equation  te W , baseline(1) through baseline(7) refer to work ages 7 through 13, while the reference is ages < 
7. For equation  ) 0 ( te S , baseline(1) through baseline(7) refer to school entry ages 6 through 12, baseline(7) 
refers to ages 13 and 14, and the reference is age = 5. For equation  ) 1 ( te S , baseline(1) refers to school entry 







Table 4.2. Dynamic Switching Model of School and Work: Primary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
  tp W   ) 0 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 1 ( tp S  
  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Intercept -3.064  -2.479 -8.188 -5.788 -11.728 -3.646  -13.628 -3.649
Baseline hazard (1)    -4.077 -22.866 -3.037 -11.709 
Girl -0.046  -0.249 -0.667 -3.114 -0.073 -0.159 
Age -0.022  -0.662 0.212 5.118 0.255 2.782 
School entry age  0.290  4.357 -0.176 -2.655 -0.006 -0.053 
Compulsory school policy  -0.511  -2.425 1.363 5.509 0.489 1.095 
Free tuition policy  -0.014  -0.063 0.363 1.380 1.262 2.595 
Free tuition policy * girl  -0.019  -0.075 0.822 2.802 0.245 0.425 
Mother￿s education  -0.041  -1.331 0.164 4.413 0.401 4.282 
Father￿s education  -0.040  -2.115 0.137 5.459 0.072 1.872 
Household assets missing  -0.552  -0.684 2.928 3.096 1.085 0.617 
Log(household assets)  -0.101  -1.444 0.342 4.061 0.228 1.517 
Modern latrine  0.087  0.639 0.590 3.659 1.630 4.372 
Cultivating household  0.434  2.494  
Owns farm land  0.390  2.116 0.541 2.818 0.741 1.662 
Owns non-farm business  0.510  3.864 0.294 1.982 0.896 2.658 
Older siblings  -0.034  -1.070 -0.013 -0.356 0.238 2.763 
Younger siblings  -0.004  -0.059 0.028 0.369 0.427 3.078 
Village outside Matlab  0.424  1.226 1.451 3.597 -1.844 -2.151 
Tubewell in village  0.061  0.351 0.653 3.406 -0.319 -0.803 
Health facility in village  0.406  2.568 1.014 5.570 0.596 1.689 
Industry in village  -0.075  -0.539 0.339 2.056 0.369 1.207 
Primary school in village  0.152  0.910 -0.262 -1.398 -0.069 -0.191 
Secondary school in village  -0.167  -1.101 -0.094 -0.545 1.097 2.819 
Distance to Matlab capital  0.049  3.317 -0.041 -2.197 -0.040 -1.280 
w θ   -0.823 -2.699  
s θ    0.836 3.723 1.901 4.408 









Table 4.3. Dynamic Switching Model of School and Work: Secondary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
ts W  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( / ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ts ts S S
  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept -4.354  -0.296 -37.013 -5.096 -50.748 -4.011  -36.176 -3.323
Baseline hazard (1)    -2.765 -5.174 -1.294 -2.265  -3.389 -4.767
Girl -9.689  -2.563 -4.354 -4.026 -0.752 -0.533  -1.316 -1.059
Age -0.697  -1.593 0.503 2.424 0.794 2.695  0.731 2.332
School entry age  6.351  3.487 0.326 1.299 -0.364 -1.007  0.091 0.274
Grade repetitions in primary  6.384  3.597 -0.374 -0.501 -4.411 -2.092  -1.714 -1.625
Free tuition policy  -10.921  -2.437 -1.100 -0.944 6.688 4.202  1.322 0.899
Free tuition policy * girl  10.239  2.448 5.988 4.217 -6.281 -3.302  0.909 0.626
Mother￿s education  -0.033  -0.174 1.057 6.031 1.438 4.373  0.448 1.825
Father￿s education  -0.078  -0.388 0.550 4.597 -0.070 -0.443  0.008 0.069
Household assets missing  -10.366  -0.898 12.162 2.604 14.424 1.635  10.265 1.679
Log(household assets)  -3.330  -2.411 1.433 3.728 1.929 2.387  1.103 2.058
Modern latrine  1.651  1.450 -0.704 -1.138 1.732 1.750  -0.707 -0.856
Cultivating household  24.740  3.887  
Owns farm land  2.762  1.577 2.540 2.397 2.638 2.146  -0.489 -0.441
Owns non-farm business  13.604  4.022 1.615 2.567 0.281 0.353  0.193 0.241
Older siblings  -2.997  -3.338 0.398 2.529 0.283 1.156  -0.406 -1.552
Younger siblings  -1.248  -2.036 0.216 0.970 -1.016 -2.076  0.250 0.964
Village outside Matlab  -8.244  -1.529 -0.611 -0.384 4.517 2.186  4.220 1.410
Tubewell in village  -6.867  -1.875 -0.953 -0.989 1.675 1.239  1.493 1.272
Health facility in village  -7.986  -2.821 -0.864 -1.009 1.818 1.569  2.517 2.050
Industry in village  4.436  1.742 6.149 5.177 -1.587 -1.534  1.927 2.289
Secondary school in village  7.856  2.945 3.548 3.812 -0.018 -0.013  2.417 2.344
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.439  -1.423 -0.360 -3.744 -0.005 -0.053  -0.234 -2.097
w θ   -34.930 -3.490  
s θ    5.923 6.690 7.123 4.314  2.810 2.903
Notes: For all school outcome equations, baseline(1) refers to 6 or more years to complete secondary school, while the reference is 





Table 5. Dynamic Effects of Work by School Outcome, Work Sequence Pair and Population 
 
 DATE  DTT  DTU 
School entry 
1 = e H  Vs  0 = e H   -0.2592 (0.042) -0.1080 (0.046) -0.2818 (0.046)
Transition to secondary school
) 1 , 1 ( = p H  Vs  ) 1 , 0 ( = p H   -0.2247 (0.060) -0.1347 (0.093) -0.2984 (0.071)
) 1 , 1 ( = p H  Vs  ) 0 , 0 ( = p H   -0.3320 (0.060) -0.1899 (0.093) -0.4165 (0.070)
) 1 , 0 ( = p H  Vs  ) 0 , 0 ( = p H   -0.1073 (0.037) -0.1197 (0.051) -0.1369 (0.043)
Secondary school completion 
) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H  Vs  ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H   -0.0395 (0.017) -0.0289 (0.034) -0.0966 (0.039)
) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H  Vs  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   -0.0961 (0.048) -0.0798 (0.066) -0.1789 (0.088)
) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H  Vs  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   -0.2474 (0.046) -0.2781 (0.073) -0.4746 (0.072)
) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H  Vs  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   -0.0566 (0.046) -0.1037 (0.086) -0.1113 (0.081)
) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H  Vs  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   -0.2079 (0.048) -0.3458 (0.081) -0.4149 (0.072)
) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H  Vs  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H   -0.1513 (0.038) -0.3137 (0.083) -0.2764 (0.066)
           Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of  s θ  Across School Levels by Work Sequence 
 
          School entry     
  1 = e H 0 = e H   
Low type  27.61 4.89  
Middle type  68.80 65.53  
High type  3.60 29.58  
 Primary  school   
  ) 1 , 1 ( = p H ) 1 , 0 ( = p H ) 0 , 0 ( = p H  
Low type  6.97 1.69 4.84  
Middle type  70.29 59.51 63.71  
High type  22.74 38.80 31.45  
 Secondary  school 
  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( = s H ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( = s H ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( = s H ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( = s H  
Low type  3.87 0.49 0.22 5.45 
Middle type  52.23 43.42 54.02 62.29 
High type  43.90 56.09 45.75 32.27 
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Table 8. Policy Simulations 
 
Policy 1: No compulsory primary schooling 
School  level  Primary  Secondary       
School  effect  -0.1934  -0.0229       
Work  effect  0.0909  0.0499       
Policy 2: School entry at 6 years of age 
School  level  Primary  Secondary       
School  effect  0.0776  0.0054       
Work  effect  -0.1609  -0.1876       
Policy 3: Secondary school availability 
School level  Entry  Primary  Secondary 
Work  sequence  (1)  (0)  (1,1)  (0,1)  (0,0)  (1,1,1) (0,1,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) 























Table A. Likelihood Ratio Tests and Bayesian Information Criterion 
 
Model Log-L  Parameters  BIC  rank 
(1) No heterogeneity  -8586.15 239  3 
(2) Normal heterogeneity  -8601.82 248  4 
(3) Non-parametric (2 factors) -8527.37 257  1 
(4) Non-parametric (3 factors) -8512.37 275  2 
Likelihood ratio tests       
(1) Vs (2)  NA     
(1) Vs (3)  χ
2(18) = 117.56 (0.000)  
(1) Vs (4)  χ
2(36) = 147.57 (0.000)  
(2) Vs (3)  χ
2(9) = 148.91 (0.000)   
(2) Vs (4)  χ
2(27) = 178.91 (0.000)  
(3) Vs (4)  χ
2(18) = 30.00 (0.000)   




















Model Without Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
Table B.1. School Entry Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
te W  ) 0 ( te S  ) 1 ( te S  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value
Intercept -6.353 -5.205 -5.348 -13.823 -5.782  -0.998
Baseline hazard (1)  2.916 3.151 1.421 12.145 1.516  0.725
Baseline hazard (2)  3.420 3.743 2.304 19.984  
Baseline hazard (3)  4.006 4.479 2.773 23.238  
Baseline hazard (4)  6.983 8.275 2.578 19.839  
Baseline hazard (5)  5.375 6.184 2.844 20.562  
Baseline hazard (6)  7.410 8.741 1.877 9.642  
Baseline hazard (7)  6.766 7.892 1.643 7.377  
Baseline hazard (8)  -0.132 -0.315  
Girl -1.005 -5.873 -0.298 -4.834 0.672  0.904
Age 0.005 0.193 0.024 2.317 -0.383  -2.932
Mother￿s education  0.077 1.299 0.116 7.942 0.207  0.979
Father￿s education  0.039 1.306 0.069 7.673 0.126  0.977
Household assets missing  -1.620 -1.999 0.293 0.823 6.982  1.237
Log(household assets)  -0.191 -2.480 0.033 1.039 0.552  1.100
Modern latrine  0.058 0.254 0.513 7.812 1.787  2.078
Cultivating household  0.176 1.030  
Owns farm land  0.234 1.497 0.404 5.670 0.011  0.010
Owns non-farm business  0.031 0.207 0.082 1.399 0.479  0.586
Older siblings  -0.063 -1.560 -0.008 -0.514 0.214  1.322
Younger siblings  0.156 2.067 -0.003 -0.089 0.373  1.139
Village outside Matlab  0.190 0.611 0.392 2.698 -2.399  -1.286
Tubewell in village  -0.101 -0.571 0.177 2.455 -0.512  -0.676
Health facility in village  -0.716 -0.865 0.935 13.379 2.838  1.279
Industry in village  -0.111 -0.502 0.257 3.030 1.581  2.273
Primary school in village  -0.125 -0.831 0.010 0.144 -0.072  -0.093
Secondary school in village  -0.777 -1.201 0.523 6.686 2.144  1.246
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.008 -0.518 -0.033 -4.914 -0.031  -0.385
Log-L -8586.153   










Table B.2. Primary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
  tp W   ) 0 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 1 ( tp S  
  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Intercept -1.458  -1.678 -5.281 -5.221 -2.944 -1.973  -3.137 -1.926
Baseline hazard (1)    -4.217 -25.905 -3.407 -16.024 
Girl -0.015  -0.086 -0.507 -2.791 0.365 1.212 
Age -0.029  -0.965 0.200 5.583 0.131 2.582 
School entry age  0.196  4.386 -0.350 -6.683 -0.356 -4.408 
Compulsory school policy  -0.497  -2.633 1.232 5.557 0.385 1.215 
Free tuition policy  -0.040  -0.198 0.332 1.403 0.667 1.977 
Free tuition policy * girl  -0.025  -0.109 0.742 2.807 -0.076 -0.193 
Mother￿s education  -0.055  -2.013 0.128 3.848 0.186 3.723 
Father￿s education  -0.038  -2.211 0.101 4.944 0.030 1.049 
Household assets missing  -0.759  -1.046 2.355 2.833 0.164 0.132 
Log(household assets)  -0.111  -1.761 0.281 3.837 0.121 1.143 
Modern latrine  0.036  0.295 0.469 3.292 0.814 3.631 
Cultivating household  0.321  2.108  
Owns farm land  0.313  1.924 0.336 2.104 0.125 0.473 
Owns non-farm business  0.433  3.790 0.257 1.923 0.459 2.318 
Older siblings  -0.034  -1.178 -0.010 -0.303 0.166 2.971 
Younger siblings  0.002  0.027 0.011 0.152 0.289 3.039 
Village outside Matlab  0.242  0.792 1.128 3.348 -1.353 -2.232 
Tubewell in village  0.085  0.539 0.614 3.568 0.119 0.455 
Health facility in village  0.289  2.156 0.776 5.189 -0.115 -0.505 
Industry in village  -0.064  -0.508 0.277 1.875 0.101 0.494 
Primary school in village  0.030  0.206 -0.350 -2.093 -0.124 -0.485 
Secondary school in village  -0.226  -1.658 -0.271 -1.770 0.451 1.939 
Distance to Matlab capital  0.041  3.224 -0.027 -1.715 -0.013 -0.587 










Table B.3. Secondary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
ts W  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( / ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ts ts S S
 Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept  5.665 3.478 -7.302 -2.924 -10.644 -2.949 -22.623 -3.405
Baseline hazard (1)    -4.401 -11.189 -3.373 -8.629  -3.658 -5.900
Girl -0.389  -1.296 -1.334 -3.041 0.051 0.091  -0.046 -0.053
Age -0.099  -1.766 0.299 3.166 0.303 2.561  0.556 2.633
School entry age  0.078  1.060 -0.339 -2.984 -0.626 -3.593  -0.577 -2.658
Grade repetitions in primary  0.343  1.486 -0.236 -0.568 -2.675 -1.845  -1.792 -1.917
Free tuition policy  -0.922  -2.678 -0.438 -0.865 2.207 3.237  1.291 1.161
Free tuition policy * girl  0.288  0.819 2.456 4.526 -1.732 -2.327  0.124 0.112
Mother￿s education  -0.042  -1.214 0.328 5.688 0.238 3.110  -0.035 -0.288
Father￿s education  0.011  0.419 0.014 0.372 0.028 0.475  -0.023 -0.300
Household assets missing  -2.698  -2.322 0.091 0.052 4.545 1.791  9.879 2.470
Log(household assets)  -0.315  -3.112 0.155 1.061 0.559 2.530  1.013 2.911
Modern latrine  0.076  0.418 0.034 0.124 0.199 0.507  -0.699 -1.249
Cultivating household  0.223  0.995  
Owns farm land  -0.232  -0.855 0.247 0.655 -0.373 -0.722  -0.100 -0.135
Owns non-farm business  0.534  2.924 0.144 0.516 -0.141 -0.394  0.220 0.409
Older siblings  -0.077  -1.616 0.167 2.432 0.132 1.467  -0.294 -1.849
Younger siblings  0.005  0.076 0.024 0.226 0.177 1.237  0.383 1.934
Village outside Matlab  -0.677  -1.494 0.818 1.047 0.494 0.538  2.763 1.506
Tubewell in village  -0.130  -0.503 0.300 0.734 0.132 0.212  1.795 2.117
Health facility in village  -0.626  -2.589 -0.364 -0.945 0.129 0.289  0.323 0.512
Industry in village  0.279  1.376 1.111 3.423 1.050 2.393  1.193 2.083
Secondary school in village  0.014  0.073 0.648 2.116 -1.678 -3.389  1.304 2.133
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.030  -1.334 0.040 1.143 0.050 1.083  -0.094 -1.657




(NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
APPENDIX C 
Model with Normal Heterogeneity 
 
Table C.1. School Entry Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
te W  ) 0 ( te S  ) 1 ( te S  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value
Intercept -6.338 -4.621 -5.463 -11.643 -5.109  -0.902
Baseline hazard (1)  2.751 2.971 1.669 13.447 1.421  0.704
Baseline hazard (2)  3.189 3.479 2.824 22.857  
Baseline hazard (3)  3.728 4.141 3.521 27.378  
Baseline hazard (4)  6.858 8.016 3.456 24.642  
Baseline hazard (5)  5.277 5.970 3.881 25.946  
Baseline hazard (6)  7.489 8.609 2.910 14.005  
Baseline hazard (7)  6.946 7.861 2.696 11.408  
Baseline hazard (8)  0.831 1.921  
Girl -1.025 -4.881 -0.387 -5.104 0.626  0.824
Age 0.005 0.165 0.015 1.196 -0.387  -2.910
Mother￿s education  0.041 0.574 0.158 8.961 0.253  1.138
Father￿s education  0.030 0.808 0.102 9.325 0.149  1.128
Household assets missing  -2.034 -2.021 -0.250 -0.561 6.693  1.240
Log(household assets)  -0.228 -2.378 -0.033 -0.830 0.520  1.078
Modern latrine  -0.020 -0.072 0.554 6.921 1.841  2.127
Cultivating household  0.240 1.160  
Owns farm land  0.151 0.765 0.575 6.481 0.138  0.176
Owns non-farm business  0.027 0.151 0.129 1.766 0.530  0.673
Older siblings  -0.079 -1.624 0.025 1.351 0.256  1.548
Younger siblings  0.161 1.756 0.018 0.429 0.350  1.046
Village outside Matlab  0.185 0.488 0.394 2.217 -2.341  -1.234
Tubewell in village  -0.149 -0.695 0.203 2.327 -0.431  -0.551
Health facility in village  -0.542 -0.642 0.998 12.000 3.063  1.394
Industry in village  -0.190 -0.716 0.227 2.201 1.707  2.352
Primary school in village  -0.159 -0.864 0.023 0.264 -0.081  -0.104
Secondary school in village  -0.730 -1.062 0.725 7.617 2.285  1.376
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.006 -0.304 -0.043 -5.014 -0.040  -0.499
w θ   1.000  
s θ   0.600 1.052 1.000 
) , ( s w Corr θ θ   -0.964 -1.923  
Log-L -8601.824   








Table C.2. Primary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
  tp W   ) 0 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 1 ( tp S  
  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Intercept -1.824  -2.020 -19.571 -6.995 -17.316 -4.314  -12.724 -2.833
Baseline hazard (1)    -2.486 -8.607 0.047 0.090 
Girl -0.003  -0.015 -0.254 -0.570 2.865 1.733 
Age -0.035  -1.109 0.311 3.869 0.457 2.250 
School entry age  0.247  4.846 -0.068 -0.616 -0.740 -2.329 
Compulsory school policy  -0.527  -2.729 3.515 4.768 -1.527 -1.067 
Free tuition policy  -0.029  -0.138 0.563 1.039 7.596 4.805 
Free tuition policy * girl  -0.058  -0.246 0.986 1.585 -7.804 -2.984 
Mother￿s education  -0.048  -1.722 0.341 4.749 2.663 5.403 
Father￿s education  -0.030  -1.696 0.544 6.048 0.518 3.833 
Household assets missing  -0.873  -1.179 5.230 2.085 -22.619 -3.117 
Log(household assets)  -0.125  -1.926 0.658 2.938 -1.488 -2.771 
Modern latrine  0.043  0.344 1.057 2.998 8.292 4.851 
Cultivating household  0.327  2.104  
Owns farm land  0.358  2.140 2.350 4.221 4.623 3.446 
Owns non-farm business  0.456  3.892 1.665 3.058 1.942 2.083 
Older siblings  -0.027  -0.924 0.048 0.493 3.688 4.875 
Younger siblings  0.012  0.211 0.144 1.028 4.773 4.853 
Village outside Matlab  0.262  0.840 4.323 3.963 -10.937 -4.083 
Tubewell in village  0.089  0.556 1.946 4.160 -0.574 -0.977 
Health facility in village  0.344  2.466 2.868 5.935 1.993 3.088 
Industry in village  -0.057  -0.444 0.626 1.717 8.110 5.104 
Primary school in village  0.016  0.104 -0.599 -1.843 -7.615 -4.165 
Secondary school in village  -0.176  -1.254 -0.219 -0.662 11.766 4.502 
Distance to Matlab capital  0.039  3.037 -0.184 -3.848 -0.258 -2.317 
w θ   -0.326 -1.737  
s θ    4.754 7.026 16.593 5.420 









Table C.3. Secondary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
ts W  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( / ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ts ts S S
  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept  7.544 3.233 -30.685 -2.553 -38.910 -4.543 -28.497 -2.950
Baseline hazard (1)    -2.799 -4.635 -0.597 -0.860  -3.644 -5.743
Girl -0.395  -1.136 -7.802 -2.764 1.525 1.789  -0.027 -0.030
Age -0.088  -1.372 0.454 1.923 0.418 1.636  0.626 2.528
School entry age  -0.071  -0.665 0.764 1.823 0.339 1.454  -0.337 -1.154
Grade repetitions in primary  0.006  0.019 4.764 2.823 -0.321 -0.199  -1.641 -1.691
Free tuition policy  -0.917  -2.240 -2.841 -2.277 4.713 3.797  1.577 1.272
Free tuition policy * girl  0.257  0.640 10.199 2.830 -8.518 -5.888  -0.082 -0.071
Mother￿s education  -0.087  -1.864 1.728 3.197 2.072 4.230  0.098 0.568
Father￿s education  -0.024  -0.739 0.527 3.101 0.725 3.884  0.010 0.116
Household assets missing  -2.725  -2.002 -6.200 -1.470 -0.662 -0.399  9.165 2.075
Log(household assets)  -0.323  -2.655 -0.130 -0.356 0.471 3.028  0.990 2.566
Modern latrine  0.038  0.187 1.082 1.724 1.142 1.499  -0.457 -0.733
Cultivating household  0.216  0.863  
Owns farm land  -0.361  -1.133 1.526 1.574 1.063 1.825  0.163 0.205
Owns non-farm business  0.407  1.902 2.924 2.946 1.333 2.033  0.363 0.609
Older siblings  -0.106  -1.818 1.078 2.786 1.159 3.331  -0.216 -1.150
Younger siblings  -0.008  -0.098 0.218 0.973 0.669 2.684  0.446 1.939
Village outside Matlab  -0.798  -1.495 0.341 0.153 -0.192 -0.073  3.183 1.589
Tubewell in village  -0.155  -0.527 -0.258 -0.318 3.475 2.219  1.954 2.089
Health facility in village  -0.861  -2.615 2.156 1.905 -0.048 -0.044  0.511 0.721
Industry in village  0.308  1.322 2.302 3.118 2.517 2.582  1.531 2.222
Secondary school in village  -0.088  -0.382 2.732 3.274 0.986 0.866  1.773 2.187
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.021  -0.799 0.091 1.275 -0.448 -2.982  -0.093 -1.529
w θ   0.928 1.461  
s θ    8.041 3.463 10.760 4.526  1.219 1.141




Model with Three-Factor Non-Parametric Heterogeneity 
 
Table D.1. Entry Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
te W  ) 0 ( te S  ) 1 ( te S  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value
Intercept -6.484 -4.556 -6.530 -12.244 -4.955  -0.847
Baseline hazard (1)  2.902 3.109 1.732 13.504 1.544  0.729
Baseline hazard (2)  3.383 3.620 2.938 22.990  
Baseline hazard (3)  3.970 4.257 3.658 27.340  
Baseline hazard (4)  7.064 7.604 3.617 23.751  
Baseline hazard (5)  5.477 5.646 4.017 23.978  
Baseline hazard (6)  7.734 7.526 3.088 13.117  
Baseline hazard (7)  7.231 6.736 2.881 10.736  
Baseline hazard (8)  1.118 2.236  
Girl -1.039 -4.675 -0.382 -4.638 0.815  0.983
Age 0.023 0.688 0.026 1.830 -0.402  -2.906
Mother￿s education  0.051 0.680 0.137 7.529 0.192  0.849
Father￿s education  0.055 1.325 0.086 7.600 0.112  0.825
Household assets missing  -2.322 -2.086 0.512 1.024 6.449  1.165
Log(household assets)  -0.251 -2.397 0.052 1.171 0.497  1.004
Modern latrine  0.008 0.012 0.647 7.597 1.711  1.935
Cultivating household  0.227 1.073  
Owns farm land  0.275 1.193 0.518 5.471 0.059  0.074
Owns non-farm business  0.052 0.248 0.133 1.584 0.498  0.618
Older siblings  -0.056 -0.966 -0.011 -0.603 0.257  1.547
Younger siblings  0.159 1.688 0.016 0.352 0.328  0.935
Village outside Matlab  0.205 0.527 0.494 2.620 -2.404  -1.251
Tubewell in village  -0.132 -0.593 0.183 1.864 -0.450  -0.557
Health facility in village  -0.580 -0.691 1.214 10.569 3.497  1.536
Industry in village  -0.147 -0.548 0.275 1.783 1.707  2.298
Primary school in village  -0.211 -1.092 0.040 0.282 -0.168  -0.205
Secondary school in village  -0.823 -1.188 0.607 5.999 1.837  1.089
Distance to Matlab capital  -0.015 -0.705 -0.035 -2.629 -0.027  -0.332
w θ   1.000  
s θ   1.000 1.000 
) , ( 0 s w Corr θ θ   -0.103  
) , ( 1 s w Corr θ θ   -0.732  
) , ( 1 0 s s Corr θ θ   0.132  
Log-L -8512.369   








Table D.2. Primary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
  tp W   ) 0 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 0 ( tp S   ) 1 , 1 ( tp S  
  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Intercept -2.149  -1.756 -6.942 -4.236 -14.742 -1.996  -10.914 -1.323
Baseline hazard (1)    -4.152 -22.125 -0.531 -0.893 
Girl -0.012  -0.057 -0.613 -2.909 0.484 0.489 
Age -0.027  -0.793 0.200 5.176 0.671 2.697 
School entry age  0.226  3.509 -0.221 -2.298 -1.705 -4.388 
Compulsory school policy  -0.497  -2.375 1.286 5.360 2.483 1.489 
Free tuition policy  -0.059  -0.249 0.294 1.183 5.494 2.349 
Free tuition policy * girl  -0.017  -0.057 0.804 2.857 -4.262 -1.295 
Mother￿s education  -0.070  -2.278 0.144 3.712 1.502 5.156 
Father￿s education  -0.040  -2.070 0.121 4.543 0.046 0.371 
Household assets missing  -0.737  -0.926 2.535 2.865 -9.388 -2.206 
Log(household assets)  -0.110  -1.602 0.301 3.822 -0.527 -1.529 
Modern latrine  0.067  0.484 0.585 3.366 7.395 5.546 
Cultivating household  0.350  2.120  
Owns farm land  0.375  2.063 0.445 2.332 3.284 3.464 
Owns non-farm business  0.488  3.850 0.295 2.059 4.333 2.907 
Older siblings  -0.045  -1.414 -0.015 -0.431 0.736 3.726 
Younger siblings  -0.016  -0.253 0.026 0.359 -0.325 -1.046 
Village outside Matlab  0.425  1.139 1.345 3.261 0.283 0.086 
Tubewell in village  0.175  0.985 0.645 3.464 5.059 3.732 
Health facility in village  0.332  2.006 0.955 4.415 0.631 0.557 
Industry in village  -0.104  -0.757 0.294 1.897 -1.308 -2.031 
Primary school in village  0.151  0.908 -0.304 -1.723 1.267 0.620 
Secondary school in village  -0.175  -1.161 -0.197 -1.192 5.619 2.975 
Distance to Matlab capital  0.049  3.372 -0.025 -1.478 -0.214 -2.441 
w θ   -0.759 -4.548  
s θ    0.545 1.304 10.192 6.189 













Table D.3. Secondary School Level 
 
  Work equation  School equations 
 
ts W  ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( ts S  ) 1 , 1 , 1 ( / ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( ts ts S S
  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 6.251  0.555 -34.584 -2.481 -47.513 -3.747  -23.346 -1.020
Baseline hazard (1)    -2.686 -3.033 -0.466 -0.690  -3.658 -5.303
Girl -7.434  -3.412 -13.077 -3.630 -2.580 -1.611  -0.033 -0.017
Age -0.308  -0.978 0.747 1.086 0.356 1.351  0.576 1.134
School entry age  2.943  3.552 0.146 0.207 -1.374 -2.680  -0.582 -2.272
Grade repetitions in primary  3.312  2.782 -1.361 -0.898 -10.947 -3.210  -1.847 -0.248
Free tuition policy  -13.039  -3.702 -3.653 -1.665 5.092 3.116  1.382 0.532
Free tuition policy * girl  15.685  4.099 17.978 3.160 -4.585 -2.475  0.082 0.038
Mother￿s education  -1.614  -4.127 1.507 3.691 1.511 4.451  -0.040 -0.050
Father￿s education  0.616  3.333 0.368 1.478 0.213 1.182  -0.024 -0.123
Household assets missing  -18.705  -2.712 -4.380 -0.309 12.966 1.468  10.216 2.130
Log(household assets)  -2.188  -3.132 0.278 0.312 1.895 2.407  1.044 2.875
Modern latrine  1.117  1.387 1.729 1.862 -2.476 -1.974  -0.715 -0.142
Cultivating household  3.730  2.008  
Owns farm land  -1.346  -0.677 6.655 1.355 5.560 3.038  -0.089 -0.043
Owns non-farm business  7.635  3.854 3.089 2.999 3.360 2.925  0.213 0.067
Older siblings  -1.853  -3.775 0.576 2.132 0.002 0.005  -0.299 -1.427
Younger siblings  0.281  0.741 0.020 0.067 -1.268 -2.153  0.393 0.938
Village outside Matlab  1.638  0.519 2.872 1.594 8.144 2.982  2.796 0.709
Tubewell in village  4.741  2.484 -0.881 -0.581 1.002 0.724  1.812 0.452
Health facility in village  -2.516  -2.399 2.575 2.089 5.541 3.777  0.308 0.200
Industry in village  -0.821  -0.784 2.757 2.511 -2.914 -2.436  1.220 1.744
Secondary school in village  7.211  3.832 2.503 2.573 -2.380 -1.924  1.322 0.320
Distance to Matlab capital  0.390  2.647 0.363 2.860 -0.025 -0.172  -0.095 -1.515
w θ   -15.387 -4.260  
s θ    10.208 1.822 17.157 4.488  -0.081 -0.004
Notes: See notes to table 4.3. 